EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | MAILATH, G.J. ; SAMUELSON, L. ; SWINKELS, J. |
Institutions: | Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems |
Subject: | information | stategies | economic equilibrium |
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