Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Echenique, Federico ; Miralles Asensio, Antonio ; Zhang, Jun |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 195.2021, p. 1-29
|
Subject: | Efficiency | Fairness | Justified envy | Participation constraint | Pseudo-market equilibrium | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Allokation | Allocation | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Effizienz | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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