Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
Alexander S. Nesterov
| Year of publication: |
July 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Nesterov, Alexander |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 170.2017, p. 145-168
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| Subject: | Probabilistic assignment | Random serial dictatorship | Strategy-proofness | Ex-post efficiency | Weak envy-freeness | Equal division lower bound | Allokation | Allocation | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Effizienz | Efficiency | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.004 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776937