Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Yajing ; Jiao, Zhenhua ; Qin, Wen ; Shan, Jinghong |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 51.2023, 6, p. 638-642
|
Subject: | Envy-freeness | Ordinal efficiency | Random assignment | Restricted tier preference domain | The random serial dictatorship rule | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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