Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
Year of publication: |
March 2016
|
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Authors: | Forges, Françoise ; Horst, Ulrich ; Salomon, Antoine |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 45.2016, 1/2, p. 11-36
|
Subject: | Commitment | Cooperative solution | Joint plan equilibrium | Folk theorem | Private information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Folk-Theorem | Rationalität | Rationality | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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