Final Offer Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain: A Principal-Agent Approach
Year of publication: |
1988-06
|
---|---|
Authors: | McCall, Brian P. |
Institutions: | Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics |
Subject: | arbitration | incentive contracts | principal-agent problem | asymmetric information |
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