Financing capacity with stealing and shirking
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Véricourt, Francis de ; Gromb, Denis |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 11, p. 5128-5141
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Subject: | capacity investment | optimal contracts | capital diversion | financial constraints | newsvendor model | moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Kapazitätsplanung | Capacity planning | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lagerhaltungsmodell | Inventory model | Unternehmensfinanzierung | Corporate finance | Investition | Investment | Liquiditätsbeschränkung | Liquidity constraint | Produktionskapazität | Production capacity |
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