Finding the Set of Core Allocations in Matching Markets with Externalities

We study two-sided matching markets with externalities. In this kind of markets, agents have to count on the reactions of others when they deviate from the given matching. In the literature, agents expectations about these reactions are specif ed via so called estimation functions, and there are three approaches in their specif cations. The current paper provides an algorithm for each specif cation to find the set of core allocations

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Matching \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Core \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 22, 2011 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126290