Finite blockchain games

This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Subject:	blockchain \| proof-of-work \| Nash equilibrium \| subgame perfection \| selfish mining

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Series:	Working Paper ; 355
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5167/uzh-188648 [DOI] 1725351269 [GVK] hdl:10419/222569 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253772