Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. More precisely, given any model where priors have the same support and any finite $N$, there is another model with common priors which has the same $n^{\rm th}$ order beliefs for all $n\ne N$.

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Year of publication:	1997-03-21
Authors:	Lipman, Barton L.
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	common priors

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Extent:	application/x-tex application/pdf application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on ;
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407558