Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs
Year of publication: |
2005-08
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hummel, Patrick |
Institutions: | California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences |
Subject: | perfect information games | extensive games | backward induction | Weakly dominated strategies | iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies | generic payoffs |
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