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Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs

Year of publication:
2005-08
Authors: Hummel, Patrick
Institutions: California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Subject: perfect information games | extensive games | backward induction | Weakly dominated strategies | iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies | generic payoffs
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Extent:
application/pdf
Series:
Working Papers.
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
Number 1235 4 pages
Source:
RePEc - Research Papers in Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482317
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