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First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

Most of the contest literature deals with first prizes; this Paper deals with the optimality of second prizes. We show that in a three-person contest where one contestant is very strong a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant. Moreover, we consider the desirability of second prizes from the point of view of competitive balance, which matters for contests such as sports competitions.
Year of publication:
2004-07
Authors: Szymanski, Stefan ; Valletti, Tommaso
Institutions: C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject: imperfectly discriminating (logit) contests | prizes
Extent:
application/pdf
Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
Number 4484
Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791735
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