First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge.

Ths authors consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framwork is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated private valued that has several interesting properties but raises serious technical complications.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Landsberger, M. ; Rubinstein, J. ; Wolfstetter, E. ; Zamir, S.
Subject:	AUCTIONS \| INFORMATION \| PRICES

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486793