First-price vs second-price auctions under risk aversion and private affiliated values

Under a specific informational framework, we compare the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction and a second-price auction when bidders are risk averse and have private affiliated values.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Maréchal, François
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 31.2011, 2, p. 1765-1771
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	auctions \| risk aversion \| private affiliated values

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147371