Fiscal Federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model

What is the optimal wat to stabilize shocks and to take care of fiscal discipline in a fiscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for the fiscal discipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves significantly the union\'s social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the output gap and correct national preferences.

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Year of publication:	2005-10-25
Authors:	Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Inter-countries insurance \| stabilization \| fiscal discipline \| EU \| fiscal federalism \| selection adverse

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00007797/en/ Published, Economics Bulletin, 2005, 5, 11, 1-8
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008792880