Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Halac, Marina ; Yared, Pierre |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 90.2022, 5, p. 2093-2127
|
| Subject: | Private information | fiscal policy | deficit bias | enforcement constraints | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Öffentliche Finanzen | Public finance | Öffentliche Ausgaben | Public expenditure | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Haushaltsdefizit | Budget deficit |
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