Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition

This paper analyzes how a fiscal transfer scheme affects tax cooperation in a repeated-interaction model of tax competition. In particular, the paper studies whether a fiscal transfer scheme promotes or blocks voluntary tax cooperation. It is shown that the larger the scale of fiscal transfer is, the easier voluntary tax cooperation is, implying that interregional transfers for correcting fiscal gaps are consistent with voluntary tax cooperation.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Wang, Wenming ; Kawachi, Keisuke ; Ogawa, Hikaru
Published in:	FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. - ISSN 0015-2218. - Vol. 70.2014, 4, p. 556-566
Subject:	tax competition \| fiscal transfer scheme \| repeated game \| tax cooperation

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095360