Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton, Kevin Breuer, Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

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Year of publication:	March 2021
Authors:	Bolton, Gary E. ; Breuer, Kevin ; Greiner, Ben ; Ockenfels, Axel
Publisher:	Bonn : ECONtribute
Subject:	dispute resolution system \| market design \| reputation \| trust \| Vertrauen \| Confidence \| Reputation \| Online-Marketing \| Internet marketing \| Experiment \| Markenimage \| Brand image \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	ECONtribute discussion paper. - Köln : [ECONtribute], ZDB-ID 3035748-2. - Vol. no. 070
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/237315 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499119