Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
Matthias Hunold, Vasilisa Petrishcheva
| Year of publication: |
[2022]
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hunold, Matthias ; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa |
| Publisher: |
Potsdam : Universität Potsdam |
| Subject: | Backward ownership | Entry deterrence | Foreclosure | Minority shareholdings | Partial ownership | Uniform pricing | Vertical integration | Theorie | Theory | Vertikale Integration | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Markteintritt | Market entry | Kapitalbeteiligung | Equity participation | Unternehmenskonzentration | Market concentration | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten; 689 KB) Illustratioen |
|---|---|
| Series: | CEPA discussion papers. - Potsdam : Center for Economic Policy Analysis, University of Potsdam, ISSN 2628-653X, ZDB-ID 2969685-9. - Vol. no. 57 (November 2022) |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction. |
| Other identifiers: | 10.25932/publishup-56560 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013447823