Forming Efficient Networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

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Year of publication:	2004-04
Authors:	Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Subject:	Networks \| Implementation \| Shapley Value

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 123
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547440