Founder versus family owners' impact on pay dispersion among non-CEO top managers : implications for firm performance
Year of publication: |
May 2017
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Authors: | Jaskiewicz, Peter ; Block, Jörn ; Miller, Danny ; Combs, James G. |
Published in: |
Journal of management : JOM. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publ., ISSN 0149-2063, ZDB-ID 83220-0. - Vol. 43.2017, 5, p. 1524-1552
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Subject: | agency theory | family firms | founder firms | pay dispersion | signaling theory | top management teams | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Unternehmensgründung | Business start-up | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Signalling | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneurship approach |
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