Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks -- 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? -- 2. The Game of Bank Bargains -- 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks -- 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking -- 5. Banks and Democracy -- Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada -- 6. Crippled by Populism -- 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain -- 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis -- 9. Durable Partners -- Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains -- 10. Mexico -- 11. When Autocracy Fails -- 12. Inflation Machines -- 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil -- Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives -- 14. Traveling to Other Places -- 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses -- References -- Index