Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations

Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Antoci, Angelo ; Russu, Paolo ; Zarri, Luca
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 30.2010, 1, p. 720-733
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Free Riding \| Cooperation \| Strong Reciprocity \| Public Goods Game \| Evolutionary Game Theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Z1 - Cultural Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008625859