Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barberà , Salvador ; Ehlers, Lars H. |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 37.2011, 4, p. 559-574
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
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