Frenemies : how do financial firms vote on their own kind?
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
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Authors: | Keswani, Aneel ; Stolin, David ; Anh L. Tran |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 63.2017, 3, p. 631-654
|
Subject: | proxy voting | mutual funds | institutional investors | corporate governance | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Investmentfonds | Investment Fund | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Theorie | Theory | Aktionäre | Shareholders |
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