Freshness-Keeping Efforts and Value-Added Service Choice in Fresh Food Supply Chain

This study investigates a two-tier fresh food supply chain consisting of one supplier and one fresh food e-retailer, examining how the sequence of service-level decisions affects strategic choices. Freshness-keeping efforts can be provided by either the supplier or fresh food e-retailer, while the latter also offers value-added service. Four game models are established to analyze the equilibrium. It is shown that regardless of whether the supplier or the e-retailer provides freshness efforts, postponing service-level decisions leads to higher freshness efforts and service-level, resulting in higher profits for both supplier and e-retailer. Furthermore, under the same sequence of service-level decisions, both supplier and e-retailer experience increased profits when freshness efforts are undertaken by the e-retailer, with supplier experiencing a significant increase. Finally, in the absence of freshness-keeping efforts, timely service-level decisions lead to lower wholesale prices, allowing the retailer to obtain more incredible discounts from manufacturer. However, the significant increase in demand still leads to a substantial improvement in the latter's profits