Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission

We measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Courty, Pascal ; Pagliero, Mario
Institutions:	Department of Economics, European University Institute
Subject:	College admission \| frictional matching \| assortative matching \| student portfolio \| school standard

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Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series European University Institute Working Papers Number ECO2009/25
Classification:	D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040189