Friends and enemies : a model of signed network formation
Year of publication: |
September 2017
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Authors: | Hiller, Timo |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : Wiley, ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 3, p. 1057-1087
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Subject: | Signed network formation | structural balance | contest success function | bullying | economics of conflict | international relations | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziales Netzwerk | Social network | Netzwerk | Network | Unternehmensnetzwerk | Business network | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1937 [DOI] hdl:10419/197127 [Handle] |
Classification: | D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D85 - Network Formation ; F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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