From Evolutionary to Strategic Stability.

A component of Nash equilibria is potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. Anecessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Demichelis, S. ; Ritzberger, K.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	INDEXES \| GAMES \| STRATEGIC PLANNING

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	33 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669328