Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Midjord, Rune
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 119.2013, 3, p. 261-263
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Full implementation \| Direct mechanism \| Verifiable information \| Rank-order tournaments

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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