Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Midjord, Rune
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	full implementation \| direct mechanism \| verifiable information \| rank order tournaments

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DFAEII Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series DFAEII 2012.15 Number 2012-15
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158385