Full information equivalence in large elections
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Barelli, Paulo ; Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Siga, Lucas |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 90.2022, 5, p. 2161-2185
|
Subject: | Information aggregation | Codorcet jury theorem | scoring rules | large elections | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wahl | Election | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Aggregation |
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