Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria
We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We show that restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation. We also prove that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions.
Year of publication: |
2006-09
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Authors: | Mizukami, Hideki ; Wakayama, Takuma |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
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