Fully aggregative games

A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Hartley, Roger
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 631-633
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Noncooperative game theory \| Aggregative games \| Additive separability

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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