Fully Aggregative Games

A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

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Year of publication:	2009-08
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Hartley, Roger
Institutions:	College of Business and Economics, Australian National University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	10 pages longPages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064038