A Game Theoretic Approach for Tradable White Certificates Regarding Energy Rebound, Efficiency Improvement, and Government Intervention

In recent decades, many government administrations have tracked energy efficiency programs (EEPs) against environmental concerns. To facilitate this, tradable white certificates (TWCs) have been implemented as popular financial instruments used by energy-intensive sectors to boost cleaner production. In this study, we address an industrial EEP development with a TWC instrument as a multi-agent problem. We study this problem for the first time in the context of a supply chain that includes a manufacturer, an energy producer, and household energy consumers. Furthermore, we explore a new monopolistic pricing model for energy services and energy-efficient products, regarding the rebound effect, energy consumption, and social welfare. Additionally, we discuss two revenue-cost-sharing contracts and compare them as contracts using a comprehensive parametric and experimental analysis. The results show that the second proposed contract has some advantages over the first one. However, the second contract leads to less production than the first one does, while at the same time leading to less social welfare. Finally, the findings of this study suggest that the second investigated contract is a more appropriate instrument for the obligated parties than the first one when the aim is to improve the performance of TWC schemes