Game theoretic choices between corrupt dictatorship exit emoluments and nation-building CDR benefits : is there a Nash equilibrium?
Dennis Ridley and Aryanne de Silva
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Ridley, Dennis ; Silva, Aryanne de |
| Published in: |
The American economist : journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon. - London : Sage Publishing, ISSN 2328-1235, ZDB-ID 2068414-9. - Vol. 65.2020, 1, p. 51-77
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| Subject: | political economy | entrepreneurship | capitalist | capitalism | democracy | rule of law | Kapitalismus | Capitalism | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Korruption | Corruption | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Demokratie | Democracy | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Institutionelle Infrastruktur | Institutional infrastructure | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneurship approach | Rechtsstaat | Rule of law |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1177/0569434519878858 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167343