Game Theory and Business Applications

Online-Ressource (VI, 409 p. 8 illus, digital)

International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ; 194

Description based upon print version of record

Contents; Chapter1 Introduction; 1 Functional Business Areas; 2 Applications; References; Chapter2 Game Theory Models in Finance; 1 The Main Issues in Finance; 1.1 Asset Pricing; 1.2 Corporate Finance; 2 The Game-Theory Approach; 2.1 Corporate Finance; 2.2 Asset Pricing; 3 Richer Models of Information and Beliefs; 3.1 Higher Order Beliefs; 3.2 Information Cascades; 3.3 Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs; References; Chapter3 Game Theory Models in Accounting; 1 Design of Performance Measures; 1.1 The Basic Principal-Agent Model; 1.2 Monitoring

1.3 Aggregation of Signals in the Design of Performance Measures2 Transfer Pricing and Budgeting; 2.1 Coordination and Budgeting; 2.2 Transfer Pricing; 3 Adverse Selection in Audit Pricing; 3.1 Take-It-Or-Leave-It Pricing; 3.2 Pricing of Audit Risk; 3.3 Auditor Resignations and Audit Pricing; 4 Concluding Remarks; 5 Notes; References; Chapter4 Marketing Applications of Game Theory; 1 Introduction; 2 Horizontal Competition in Marketing Variables; 3 Vertical Relations; 4 Strategic Consumers; 5 Conclusion; References

Chapter5 Applications of Game Theory in Operation Management and Information Systems1 Introduction; 2 Competition in Time-Sensitive Markets; 2.1 A General Model; 2.2 A Bertrand Time-Based Competition; 2.3 A Competitive Equilibrium Model; 2.4 Discussion; 3 Priority Pricing for a Queueing System; 3.1 The Model; 3.2 An Optimal Priority Pricing Scheme; 3.3 Discussion; 4 Marketing/Manufacturing Incentives; 4.1 The Model; 4.2 The First-Best Solution; 4.3 Moral Hazard and Incentive Plan; 4.4 Discussion; 5 Information Sharing, Confidentiality and Supply Chain Coordination; 5.1 The Model

5.2 Scenario 1: Disclosure to All Firms5.3 Scenario 3: Disclosure to Manufacturer Only; 5.4 Scenario 2: Disclosure to Manufacturer and Participating Retailers; 5.5 Confidentiality, Supply Chain Coordination and Incentive Compatibility; 5.6 Discussion; 6 Distortion and Alignment in a Horizontal Supply Chain; 6.1 The Model; 6.2 Mitigating Horizontal Quantity Distortion; 6.3 Discussion; 7 Conclusion; References; Chapter6 Incentive and Strategic Contracting: Implications for the Franchise Decision; 1 Background; 2 Incentive Factors and Contract Choice; 2.1 The Basic Model; 2.2 Local-Market Risk

2.3 Agent or Franchisee Effort2.4 Outlet Size; 2.5 Costly Monitoring; 2.6 Principal or Franchisor Effort; 2.7 Multiple Tasks; 2.8 Within-Firm Contract Uniformity; 2.9 Studies Focused on Contract Terms; 3 Adding Strategic Considerations to Contract Choice; 3.1 Spillovers Within Chains; 3.2 Product Substitution; 3.3 Strategic Delegation of the Pricing Decision; 4 The Agent's Choice; 5 Final Remarks; 6 Notes; A. Algebraic Derivations; A.1 Risk; A.2 Agent Effort; A.3 Outlet Size; A.4 Costly Monitoring; A.5 Franchisor Effort; A.6 Multiple Tasks; A.7 Spillovers Within Chains

A.8 Product Substitution

10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3 [DOI]

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