Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence
Year of publication: |
1987-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Shubik, Martin |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Game theory | nuclear deterrence | arms race | escalation | retaliation | threat |
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