Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria

In a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called "exclusive matchability (EM)": the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2003-01-13
Authors:	Suh, Sang-Chul
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2003, 1, p. 33-39
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147210