Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Lehrer, Ehud ; Rosenberg, Dinah ; Shmaya, Eran
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 81.2013, C, p. 179-191
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Incomplete information \| Information structure \| Correlated equilibrium \| Garbling \| Robustness

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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