Gathering Information by a Partially Informed Agent

This paper considers an agency contracting with multiple alternative tasks. The agent is privately informed on some tasks, but he must gather information on the other tasks. We show that depending on the cost to gather information, choice of task is employed as an instrument to induce information gathering when the cost of information gathering is small, but as an instrument to induce a truthful report when the cost of information gathering is large

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Shin, Dongsoo ; Yun, Sungho
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 675-694, December 2006 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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