General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information.

This paper studies competitive equilibria in economics characterized by the presence of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). We consider economies where non-exclusive contracts (securities) with payoffs dependent on the agents' private information are trade on competitive markets. It is shown that the existence of competitive equilibria is not guaranteed under the same set of assumptions as with symmetric information.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Bisin, A. ; Gottardi, P.
Institutions:	Département et Laboratoire d'Économie Théorique Appliquée (DELTA), École Normale Supérieure (ENS Paris)
Subject:	INFORMATION

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Series:	DELTA Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	47 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256731