General equilibrium with private state verification

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. Enforceable trade agreements can be described by Pi-measurable plans of lists of bundles, instead of Pi-measurable plans of bundles as in Radner (1968). In equilibrium, the price of a list coincides with the price of the cheapest bundle in the list, and it is always the cheapest bundle of the list that is delivered. This property leads to a system of linear inequalities which are deliverability constraints on the choice set. We investigate existence of equilibrium in the case in which preferences are Pi-measurable. If there is a perfectly informed trader in the economy, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed.