Generalized assignment problem : truthful mechanism design without money
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fadaei, Salman ; Bichler, Martin |
Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 45.2017, 1, p. 72-76
|
Subject: | Mechanism design without money | Generalized assignment problem | Truthfulness | Approximation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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