Generalized majority rules : utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Faravelli, Marco ; Man, Priscilla |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 72.2021, 1, p. 21-48
|
Subject: | Supermajority | Qualified majority | Costly voting | Voter turnout | Compulsory voting | Poisson game | Theorie | Theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wahlsystem | Electoral system |
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