Glass Ceilings and Arbitral Dealings : Explaining the Gender Gap in International Investment Arbitration

Investment arbitration has long been dominated by a coterie of Western “grand old men.” Is it still? In this paper, we examine the inroads women have made, drawing on a new database of approximately 4000 individuals in investment arbitration. We exploit the variation in appointment procedures between the roles in arbitration: arbitrator (distinguishing between institutional appointments and party appointments), expert, counsel, and tribunal secretary. Building from the central insight that appointment procedures matter, we develop three complementary hypotheses to explain why the proportion of women in these roles varies. We argue women are more likely to be appointed in roles with more formalized selection procedures; more likely to be appointed as arbitrators by institutions; and that a strong “known quantity” norm inhibits new entrants to the “club” of arbitrators. Analyzing gender is an entry point to illuminate broader patterns about appointment and what inhibits other forms of diversity, notably geographical representativeness. Although hundreds of appointments are made each year, appointment procedures that leave implicit biases unchecked and a strong “known quantity” norm entrench a highly unrepresentative group of individuals as arbitrators