The first edition of the GNSS and Secure SATCOM User Technology Report provides insights into the technology features and trends of both GNSS and secure SATCOM domains and their possible synergies. As new GNSS frequencies and signals become available for civilian applications, receivers' manufacturers are keeping up to speed by upgrading their receivers' baselines, thus addressing most of the 110 GNSS satellites in Medium Earth Orbit. This advancement in receivers' technology is well supported by the international coordination among GNSS, RNSS, and SBAS providers that has led to the adoption of open access signals with compatible frequency plans, common multiple access schemes, and modulation schemes. Also, a GNSS service-oriented approach is clearly emerging; building on top of the infrastructure development, an extended service portfolio will provide the GNSS users with increased performance and security. European GNSS is at the forefront of this process as underscored by the recently rolled-out Galileo High Accuracy Service (HAS) or Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) feature.The present report also outlines key evolutionary trends in the secure SATCOM domain by emphasising enhanced performance and system management optimisation that can now rely on digitalisation processes, cloud environments, the advent of AI techniques and the standardisation effort for the integration of non-terrestrial networks in the 5G ecosystem. Ongoing deployment of large NGSO (Non-Geostationary Orbits) constellations is also aiming at improved performances, most notably reduced latency transmissions, relying on more advanced user terminals that need to track and switch among multiple fast-moving satellites across the sky. This report also emphasises significant developments that directly affect users, particularly those requiring enhanced security in SATCOM transmissions. Like terrestrial communications, satellite communications face risks from malicious actors, including communication disruptions (availability threats), eavesdropping (compromising confidentiality), and content tampering (impacting integrity). Over the last decades, cyberattacks targeting SATCOM systems have indeed increased sharply. "Traditional" signal jamming attacks, which began over 40 years ago, have recently been accompanied by more sophisticated threats such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), and malware deployment. As a result, the development of governmental and commercial SATCOM systems is increasingly driven by the growing demand of enhanced confidentiality, integrity and availability when it comes to the satellite communication links. With the digitalisation of core system components, SATCOM systems are transitioning from legacy hardware- centric designs to modern software-oriented solutions, including those at the user terminal level. This digital shift enables user terminals to leverage multiple constellations and frequencies, significantly improving communication link availability thus mitigating disruptions caused by natural factors (e.g., unfavourable weather conditions or signal obstructions) or intentional interferences (e.g. jamming attacks). Additionally, advancements such as the integration of modern 5G security features, the use of optical communications, which are inherently more resistant to jamming and spoofing, and experimental quantum communication links for ultra-secure encryption key distribution are all addressing the evolving threat landscape.
