Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán-González
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Corgnet, Brice ; Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín ; Hernán González, Roberto |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 109.2018, p. 311-326
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| Subject: | Goal setting | Incentive theory | Laboratory experiments | Non-monetary incentives | Principal-agent models | Reference-dependent utility | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Experiment | Motivationstheorie | Motivation theory | Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel | Corporate objective | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173215